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TARP	  Repayment,	  Lobbying	  and	  Political	  Connectivity	  
Ian	  Simmons	  
1.	  Introduction	  
In	  their	  paper	  “Corporate	  Lobbying,	  Political	  Connections,	  and	  the	  
Bailout	  of	  Banks,”	  Blau,	  Brough,	  and	  Thomas	  (2012)	  present	  significant	  
evidence	  that	  firms	  that	  engaged	  in	  lobbying	  and	  maintain	  political	  
connection	  with	  the	  federal	  government	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  receive	  
funds	  from	  the	  Troubled	  Asset	  Relief	  Program	  (TARP),	  received	  more	  
funds	  on	  average,	  and	  received	  the	  funds	  earlier	  than	  those	  firms	  that	  
did	  not	  lobby	  or	  maintain	  political	  connections.	  	  These	  results	  fit	  into	  a	  
large	  body	  of	  work	  showing	  similar	  results	  showing	  that	  lobbying	  has	  
positive	  economic	  benefits	  to	  lobbying	  firms	  (Chen	  and	  Yang,	  2010;	  
Cooper	  and	  Ovtchinnikov,	  2010;	  Faccio,	  2010;	  Facio,	  Masulis	  and	  
McConnell,	  2006;	  Fisman,	  2001;	  Goldman	  and	  Rocholl,	  2009;	  Igan,	  
Mishra	  and	  Tressel,	  2009;	  Langbein	  and	  Lotwis,	  1990).	  	  Li	  (2012)	  also	  
found	  that	  political	  connections	  led	  to	  increased	  probability	  of	  receiving	  
TARP	  funds.	  	  	  
Less	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  the	  behavior	  of	  firms	  that	  lobbied	  
after	  receiving	  government	  bailouts;	  Duchin	  and	  Sosyura	  (2011)	  do	  
show	  that	  banks	  that	  received	  bailouts	  look	  less	  risky	  due	  to	  better	  
capitalization	  ratios;	  however,	  bailed	  out	  banks	  also	  tend	  to	  increase	  
risky	  lending	  and	  therefore	  show	  an	  increase	  in	  volatility	  and	  default	  
risk.	  	  However,	  to	  our	  knowledge,	  no	  study	  has	  been	  done	  that	  
attempts	  to	  isolate	  the	  difference	  in	  repayment	  behavior	  between	  
connected	  and	  non-­‐connected	  banks	  following	  a	  widespread	  bailout.	  	  	  
In	  this	  study,	  we	  extend	  the	  literature	  by	  studying	  the	  factors	  that	  
led	  to	  repayment	  of	  TARP	  funds,	  specifically	  comparing	  those	  banks	  
that	  did	  and	  did	  not	  maintain	  political	  connections	  in	  the	  years	  leading	  
up	  to	  the	  2008	  financial	  crisis.	  
	   Political	  engagement	  is	  approximated	  in	  two	  ways.	  	  Following	  
Faccio,	  Masulis,	  McConnel	  (2006)	  we	  proxy	  political	  engagement	  of	  
firms	  by	  the	  number	  of	  employees	  at	  a	  firm	  that	  were	  previously	  
employed	  with	  the	  federal	  government	  or	  vice	  versa.	  	  Following	  Yu	  and	  
Yu	  (2010),	  political	  engagement	  is	  also	  proxied	  by	  lobbying	  
expenditures.	  
	   We	  find	  no	  evidence	  that	  firms	  that	  engaged	  in	  lobbying	  or	  
maintaining	  political	  connections	  via	  employees	  showed	  any	  difference	  
in	  the	  likelihood	  of	  repaying	  TARP.	  	  The	  primary	  determinants	  appear	  to	  
be	  volatility	  (negatively),	  price,	  and	  the	  size	  of	  the	  firm,	  particularly	  
relative	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  bailout	  received.	  	  In	  both	  statistical	  and	  
economic	  terms,	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  found	  is	  volatility.	  	  	  
	   	  
2.	  Data	  
Data	  is	  gathered	  for	  the	  237	  publicly	  traded	  firms	  that	  received	  bailout	  
money	  under	  TARP.	  	  The	  amount	  of	  money	  received	  by	  each	  firm	  is	  
taken	  from	  the	  Department	  of	  the	  Treasury.	  	  Firm	  characteristics	  are	  
compiled	  from	  multiple	  sources.	  	  From	  the	  Center	  for	  Research	  on	  
Security	  Prices	  (CRSP)	  daily	  stock	  prices	  and	  market	  capitalization	  are	  
gathered.	  	  Quarterly	  balance	  sheets	  obtained	  from	  Compustat	  are	  used	  
to	  determine	  debt	  to	  equity	  ratios	  and	  total	  assets.	  	  All	  time	  specific	  
variables	  are	  averaged	  over	  the	  time	  period	  ranging	  from	  January	  1,	  
2007	  to	  the	  date	  each	  individual	  firm	  signed	  the	  contracts	  accepting	  
TARP	  funds.	  
Lobbying	  amounts	  come	  from	  the	  Center	  for	  Responsive	  Politics	  (CRP),	  
and	  are	  the	  total	  expenditure	  on	  lobbying	  by	  firms	  over	  the	  five	  years	  
prior	  to	  TARP.	  	  Blau	  et	  al	  (2012),	  drawing	  from	  Kroszner	  and	  Stratmann	  
(1998)	  argue	  that	  the	  use	  of	  aggregate	  data	  of	  this	  manner	  is	  justified,	  
as	  the	  makeup	  of	  contributions	  across	  firms	  is	  very	  similar.	  	  The	  same	  
assumption	  is	  taken	  here.	  	  Data	  on	  political	  connectedness	  also	  comes	  
from	  CRP,	  specifically	  from	  its	  Revolving	  Door	  Database.	  	  It	  is	  a	  dummy	  
variable	  equal	  to	  one	  if	  a	  firm	  employs	  someone	  formerly	  employed	  by	  
the	  federal	  government,	  the	  federal	  government	  currently	  employs	  
someone	  previously	  employed	  by	  the	  firm,	  or	  an	  employee	  is	  
concurrently	  employed	  by	  the	  firm	  and	  the	  federal	  government.	  
	  Table	  1	  reports	  summary	  statistics	  for	  the	  sample.	  The	  average	  firm	  
had	  a	  stock	  price	  (Price)	  of	  $20.65,	  market	  capitalization	  (size)	  of	  $4.97	  
billion,	  turnover	  (Turn)	  of	  9.43%,	  and	  debt-­‐to-­‐equity	  ratio	  (DE)	  of	  10.69.	  	  
The	  average	  idiosyncratic	  volatility	  (Volatility),	  which	  is	  the	  standard	  
deviation	  of	  daily	  CAPM	  residuals,	  was	  .0299.	  	  The	  average	  firm	  had	  
total	  assets	  (TotAssets)	  of	  45,374	  (reported	  in	  millions).	  	  The	  size	  of	  the	  
average	  baiout	  (Bailout)	  was	  roughly	  681	  million.	  	  Eight	  percent	  of	  firms	  
engaged	  in	  lobbying	  activity	  (LobDum),	  the	  average	  amount	  spent	  by	  
those	  firms	  being	  $8.8	  million.	  	  Roughly	  seven	  percent	  of	  firms	  were	  
politically	  connected	  (connected),	  as	  previously	  defined.	  
Table	  2	  reports	  the	  difference	  in	  means	  between	  those	  firms	  that	  have	  
paid	  back	  versus	  those	  that	  have	  not.	  	  Firms	  that	  paid	  back	  had	  higher	  
prices,	  were	  larger,	  less	  volatile	  and	  had	  higher	  turnover.	  	  They	  also	  
were	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  lobbied	  and	  been	  politically	  connected.	  	  Table	  
2	  also	  shows	  that	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  size	  of	  the	  bailout	  relative	  to	  the	  
size	  of	  a	  firm	  is	  more	  statistically	  significant	  than	  absolute	  size	  of	  the	  
firm	  or	  bailout	  alone.	  	  The	  differences	  in	  means	  of	  all	  other	  variables	  
were	  not	  statistically	  different	  from	  zero.	  
	  
3.	  Analysis	  and	  Results	  
First,	  a	  baseline	  model	  was	  estimated	  by	  probit	  using	  all	  variables	  from	  
table	  2	  that	  exhibited	  statistically	  different	  means	  between	  firms	  that	  
had	  and	  had	  not	  paid	  back,	  excluding	  interaction	  terms.	  	  For	  both	  size	  
and	  total	  assets,	  the	  log	  transformation	  was	  taken.	  	  A	  dummy	  variable	  
(lobDUM)	  was	  used	  for	  lobbying	  instead	  of	  the	  total	  amount,	  as	  Table	  2	  
did	  not	  show	  a	  large	  difference	  between	  lobbying	  amounts	  for	  firms	  
that	  had	  repaid	  versus	  those	  that	  had	  not.	  	  Probit	  regressions	  were	  
used	  to	  estimate	  the	  following	  model:	  
Paybacki	  =	  β	  0	  +	  β1Pricei+	  	  	  β2ln(Sizei)+	  	  β3Voli+	  	  β4turni	  +	  	  β5Connectedi	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  +	  β6lobDUMi	  +	  εi	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (1)	  
The	  size	  of	  the	  sample	  is	  237.	  	  Of	  those	  34	  had	  paid	  back	  and	  203	  had	  
not.	  	  	  Payback	  is	  equal	  to	  one	  if	  firm	  i	  paid	  back,	  zero	  otherwise.	  	  	  
The	  results	  are	  found	  in	  table	  3.	  	  In	  equation	  1,	  only	  volatility	  is	  
statistically	  significant,	  with	  a	  large	  negative	  effect	  (p-­‐value	  <.0001).	  	  To	  
deal	  with	  multicolinearity	  and	  provide	  robustness,	  a	  variety	  of	  
additional	  models	  are	  presented.	  	  Equation	  2	  is	  a	  simple	  expansion	  of	  1;	  
Debt	  to	  Equity,	  the	  size	  of	  the	  bailout	  (in	  millions)	  and	  the	  log	  of	  total	  
assets	  are	  included.	  	  In	  this	  model	  size	  does	  appear	  to	  be	  significant,	  
with	  a	  value	  of	  1.056915	  (p-­‐value	  0.0243).	  	  However,	  as	  3	  and	  4	  show,	  
the	  significance	  of	  absolute	  size	  disappears	  when	  an	  interaction	  term	  
between	  size	  of	  the	  firm	  and	  size	  of	  the	  bailout	  is	  included.	  	  Equation	  3	  
drops	  absolute	  size	  of	  bailout,	  which	  was	  insignificant	  in	  equation	  2,	  but	  
interacts	  the	  size	  of	  bailout	  with	  both	  total	  assets	  and	  size	  of	  the	  firm.	  	  	  
Equation	  4	  drops	  the	  interaction	  between	  bailout	  size	  and	  total	  assets,	  
as	  total	  assets	  alone	  appear	  to	  be	  more	  significant.	  	  Equation	  5	  
intentionally	  stacks	  the	  odds	  in	  favor	  of	  finding	  that	  political	  
connections	  are	  significant;	  instead	  of	  testing	  separately	  for	  lobbying	  
expenditure	  and	  employee	  connections,	  it	  compares	  those	  firms	  which	  
engaged	  in	  both	  against	  all	  others.	  	  Even	  then,	  no	  statistical	  significance	  
is	  found.	  	  	  
	   Table	  4	  reports	  the	  marginal	  probabilities	  calculated	  from	  the	  
results	  of	  the	  probit	  regressions.	  	  	  We	  can	  see	  that	  political	  connections	  
and	  lobbying	  don’t	  appear	  to	  be	  any	  more	  economically	  significant	  than	  
statistically.	  	  Political	  connectivity’s	  effects	  are	  largest	  in	  Column	  2,	  
where	  connected	  banks	  appear	  to	  be	  roughly	  6.7	  percent	  less	  likely	  to	  
have	  paid	  back	  their	  TARP	  funds;	  Lobbying’s	  effects	  appear	  even	  more	  
meager.	  	  The	  sign	  is	  inconsistent	  across	  models,	  being	  positive	  in	  model	  
1	  and	  negative	  everywhere	  else.	  	  The	  absolute	  value	  of	  the	  marginal	  
probability	  to	  pay	  back	  from	  lobbying	  never	  exceeds	  2.3	  percent.	  
The	  main	  results	  are	  consistent	  across	  models:	  Volatility	  has	  a	  
large	  negative	  impact	  on	  likeliness	  to	  pay,	  as	  does	  the	  size	  of	  the	  
bailout	  relative	  to	  a	  firm’s	  size.	  	  No	  model	  specification	  was	  able	  to	  
show	  that	  either	  lobbying	  or	  political	  connectivity	  had	  a	  statistically	  
significant	  effect	  on	  likeliness	  to	  pay.	  	  An	  interaction	  term	  representing	  
firms	  that	  had	  both	  lobbied	  and	  maintained	  political	  connections	  also	  
failed	  to	  exhibit	  statistical	  significance.	  	  It	  is	  concluded	  that	  we	  are	  
completely	  unable	  to	  reject	  the	  null	  hypotheses	  that	  lobbying	  and	  
political	  connectivity	  had	  no	  effect	  on	  likelihood	  of	  paying	  back	  TARP.	  
	  
4.	  Conclusions	  
The	  majority	  of	  the	  results	  are	  largely	  unsurprising.	  	  Firms	  whose	  prices	  
exhibited	  great	  volatility	  struggled	  to	  pay	  back.	  If	  volatility	  represents	  
uncertainty	  about	  a	  firm,	  this	  would	  be	  expected.	  	  Further,	  the	  larger	  
the	  bailout	  a	  firm	  received	  relative	  to	  the	  firm’s	  size,	  the	  less	  likely	  they	  
were	  to	  have	  paid	  back.	  	  This	  result	  perfectly	  follows	  intuition.	  	  
Reassuringly,	  firms	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  political	  engagement	  do	  not	  
exhibit	  lower	  likelihoods	  of	  paying	  back.	  	  Although	  Duchin	  and	  Sosyura	  
(2011)	  do	  show	  that	  bailed	  out	  firms	  do	  tend	  to	  take	  on	  riskier	  
portfolios,	  our	  study	  suggests	  that	  this	  effect	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  
more	  pronounced	  in	  connected	  firms	  than	  non-­‐connected.	  	  	  Though	  
firms	  that	  engage	  in	  lobbying	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  
receive	  bailout	  funds	  in	  economically	  turbulent	  times,	  it	  does	  not	  
appear	  that	  they	  received	  any	  preferential	  treatment	  in	  terms	  of	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  (2.86598006)	  
14338757396*	  
	  	  (1.899256365)	  
-­‐0.008885341***	  
	  	  (-­‐9.226664645)	  
0.046323056**	  
	  	  (2.639955175)	  
1204609445	  
	  	  (1.376612083)	  
0.256184044	  
	  	  (0.346411357)	  
6117146	  
	  	  (0.865758905)	  
125010.6467	  
	  	  (1.681670419)	  
0.156621269**	  
	  	  (2.174825213)	  
0.146769052*	  
	  	  (2.029527234)	  
-­‐0.094542044***	  
	  	  (-­‐6.252183634)	  
-­‐3624**	  
	  	  (-­‐2.656856983)	  
Values	  in	  ()	  report	  t-­‐statistic.	  	  *,	  **,	  and	  ***	  represent	  	  10%,	  5%	  and	  1%	  significance	  levels	  respectively.	  	  TotAssets	  
is	  reported	  in	  millions.	  	  Connected	  and	  LobDum	  are	  both	  dummy	  variables	  previously	  defined.	  	  The	  associated	  







Table	  3	  	  
Probit	  Regression	  
	   Dependent	  variable	  is	  1	  if	  repaid	  –	  0	  otherwise	  













































































































































44.94	   52.512	   54.749	   54.926	   54.951	  
P-­‐values	  reported	  in	  ().	  	  For	  the	  calculation	  of	  “Bailut/TotAssets,”	  total	  assets	  were	  listed	  in	  billions.	  	  All	  other	  




Table	  4	  	  	  
Marginal	  probabilities	  from	  probit	  regression	  











Connected	  and	  Lobbied	  
	  
-­‐0.00183	  
0.01479	  
-­‐19.2826	  
0.06546	  
0.06320	  
-­‐0.01034	  
-­‐0.00208	  
0.17451	  
-­‐16.89731	  
-­‐0.05816	  
0.06788	  
0.00721	  
-­‐0.000006	  
0.15764	  
	  
-­‐0.002104	  
0.1135881	  
-­‐15.8281443	  
0.1118822	  
0.0301339	  
0.0221638	  
-­‐0.1138263	  
0.011073	  
-­‐0.4313043	  
-­‐0.9849406	  
-­‐0.0020867	  
0.0964902	  
-­‐15.9688674	  
0.1085376	  
0.0320871	  
0.0201658	  
-­‐0.0970339	  
0.0109621	  
-­‐0.5397626	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
-­‐0.0020105	  
0.1017132	  
-­‐15.8661297	  
0.0764029	  
	  
	  
-­‐0.0973222	  
0.0114863	  
-­‐0.5382197	  
	  
0.0184339	  
	  
	  
